



EDUSKUNTA - PARLIAMENT OF FINLAND

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

17.5.2022

The Foreign Affairs Committee report on

- Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment
- Government Report on Finland's Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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INTRODUCTION

Initiation

Government Report on Changes in the Security Environment (VNS 1/2022 vp): The item has been submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee for a report. In addition, the item has been submitted for statements to the Finance Committee, Administration Committee, Legal Affairs Committee, Transport and Communications Committee, Agriculture and Forestry Committee, Defence Committee, Education and Culture Committee, Commerce Committee, Committee for the Future, and Employment and Equality Committee.

Government Report on Finland's Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (VNS 3/2022 vp): The item has been submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee for a report.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has considered these reports collectively and will issue a collective report regarding them.

Statements

The following statements have been issued:

- Administration Committee HaVL 14/2022 vp
- Legal Affairs Committee LaVL 14/2022 vp
- Transport and Communications Committee LiVL 18/2022 vp
- Agriculture and Forestry Committee MmVL 11/2022 vp
- Defence Committee PuVL 3/2022 vp
- Education and Culture Committee SiVL 11/2022 vp
- Commerce Committee TaVL 23/2022 vp
- Committee for the Future TuVL 2/2022 vp
- Employment and Equality Committee TyVL 3/2022 vp
- Finance Committee VaVL 8/2022 vp

Experts

The Committee has consulted:

- Prime Minister Sanna Marin
- Minister for Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen, Ministry of Defence
- Secretary General Hiski Haukkala, Office of the President of the Republic of Finland
- Under-Secretary of State Kai Sauer, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Director General Piritta Asunmaa, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Director General Marja Liivala, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Deputy Director General Olli Kantanen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Deputy Director General Tanja Jääskeläinen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Director General Kaija Suvanto, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Director Salla Sammalkivi, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Director Minna Laajava, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Counsellor Lauri Hirvonen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Mikko Hautala, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Antti Helänterä, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Maimo Henriksson, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Klaus Korhonen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

- Ambassador Anne Sipiläinen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Jukka Siukosaari, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Teemu Tanner, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador, Senior Adviser Jarmo Viinanen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador for Cyber Affairs Jarmo Sareva, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Heikki Talvitie
- Defence Attaché Joakim Salonen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Special Adviser (international affairs) Lauri Voionmaa, Prime Minister's Office
- Permanent Secretary Esa Pulkkinen, Ministry of Defence
- Defence Policy Director, Director General Janne Kuusela, Ministry of Defence
- Chief of Defence, General Timo Kivinen, Finnish Defence Forces
- Chief of Intelligence, Rear Admiral Juha Vauhkonen, Defence Command
- Senior Researcher Fred Blombergs, Finnish Defence Forces
- General (retired) Gustav Hägglund
- Director Antti Pelttari, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service
- Director of Government Security Ahti Kurvinen, Prime Minister's Office
- Director Teija Tiilikainen, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats
- Programme Director Juha Jokela, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Leading Researcher Matti Pesu, Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Director Markku Kangaspuro, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki
- Political Scientist Iro Särkkä, University of Helsinki
- Distinguished Associate Fellow Dr Tarja Cronberg, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
- Doctor of Political Science Pekka Visuri

The Committee has also met with:

- President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö

The Committee has received a written statement from:

- Government of Åland
- Chair Tarja Cronberg, Peace Union of Finland

THE COMMITTEE'S ARGUMENTS

Content of the Government report

- (1) The Finnish Government submits a report on Finland's foreign and security policy to Parliament once per parliamentary term. These reports and the response issued to them by Parliament collectively form Finland's foreign and security policy.
- (2) On 13 April 2022, the Government submitted a report to Parliament regarding Finland's changed security and operating environment on account of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The report complements the 2020 Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy as well as the 2021 Government Defence Report, Government Report on Internal Security, and Government Report on EU Policy. The key content of the report concerns methods to reinforce Finland's military security in the changed security environment. The methods examined include the development of Finland's national defence capability, the EU's role as a security policy actor and enhancing Finland's bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. The Government report also assesses closer cooperation with NATO and the effects of Finland's potential NATO membership. This security and defence policy section of the report was a particular focus in the hearings of experts by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

- (3) The operating environment examined in the Government report focuses on the present situation. In its consideration of the Government report, the Foreign Affairs Committee sought, by hearing experts despite the tight schedule, to examine the change in the operating environment over the longer term and assess the choices affecting Finland's security.
- (4) The Government report also assesses the impacts of the changed security situation on the economy, crisis resilience, security of supply, internal security, cyber security, hybrid influence activities and critical infrastructure. The statement committees (Administration Committee, Legal Affairs Committee, Transport and Communications Committee, Agriculture and Forestry Committee, Defence Committee, Education and Culture Committee, Commerce Committee, Committee for the Future, Employment and Equality Committee and Finance Committee) have addressed these themes in their hearings of experts and statements. In this committee report, the Foreign Affairs Committee also brings up the key observations made by the statement committees regarding the aforementioned themes.
- (5) Due to the fundamental change in the security environment as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Committee considers it to be justified that the Government submitted a supplementary proposal on security policy for consideration by Parliament. Consideration of the supplementary proposal in the form of a Government report is important to allow for comprehensive parliamentary deliberation and to ensure that an up-to-date national view extending across parliamentary terms is established about Finland's foreign and security policy, including Finland's potential NATO membership.
- (6) On 15 May 2022, the Government submitted to Parliament a new supplementary report to the aforementioned report, proposing that Finland join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this committee report, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers both of the Government reports mentioned above and issues a collective response to the Government regarding them.

Changed security and operating environment

- (7) In regards to the direct impacts to Ukraine arising from the Russian invasion, the Committee considers it to be of the utmost importance that Finland continue providing broad-based support to Ukraine both bilaterally and as part of the European Union and the wider international community, including by providing defence materiel. In addition to the provision of support, it is important to promote an immediate end to the military action and, through negotiations, seek a resolution that contributes to sustainable peace. Furthermore, it is important for Finland, as part of the international community, to participate in actions to hold Russia and its representatives accountable for the impacts and consequences of the illegal war of aggression. During the invasion, Russian troops in Ukraine have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law that also carry criminal liability. The Foreign Affairs Committee joins with the Legal Affairs Committee in emphasising the importance of Finland's support to the International Criminal Court's investigation of war crimes.
- (8) Russia's foreign policy, which has relied on military strength for a long time, and the country's stated objective of wanting to maintain a security structure based on spheres of influence in Europe gained a new dimension when Russia launched a war of aggression against Ukraine. The war has made evident that the threshold for the use of military force has been lowered, and it has highlighted the unchecked capability of an authoritarian system to resort to military action. Russia has also repeatedly indicated its preparedness to use nuclear weapons. Russia does not appear to be interested in seeking joint solutions with the West for the stabilisation of Europe's security policy situation. As a result of the war, a sharper and longer-term juxtaposition has formed between Russia and the West, although the forms and duration of this juxtaposition are difficult to anticipate at this stage. Consequently, the Foreign Affairs Committee deems that Finland's immediate security environment has deteriorated decisively, as put forward in the Government report.

- (9) The Foreign Affairs Committee agrees with the unequivocal starting point of the Government report that this change in the security environment is significant and requires actions to reinforce Finland's security. Choosing not to respond to the situation would narrow Finland's room to manoeuvre in terms of its foreign, security and defence policy. In its statement (PuVL 3/2022 vp), the Defence Committee notes that, although the Finnish Defence Forces have high capability and Finland's defence system has been purposefully developed for decades, the war waged by Russia in Ukraine has once again shown it to be an impossible task to protect civilian targets from long-range weapons. A key objective in Finland's security policy, as expressed in Government reports, has been to ensure that Finland is not pulled into a military conflict. This is highlighted in the changed security situation. The question is which defensive arrangements provide the greatest possible deterrent.
- (10) In its statement, the Committee for the Future considered Russia's development in depth, both in historical terms and based on alternative future scenarios. These analyses also come to the conclusion that Russia's negative development, which started in the early 2000s, and the geopolitical tensions caused by the most recent dimension of this development, i.e. Russia's war of aggression, will not improve in the next few years, and Russia will also maintain its sphere-of-interest approach in the future (TuVL 2/2022 vp).
- (11) The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it to be important that the Government report also brings up the impacts of Russia's war of aggression on the multilateral rule-based system. The war is a clear indication of the authoritarian state's disregard for international law and further highlights the importance of supporting and reinforcing human rights, democracy and rule of law as part of Finland's foreign policy. The human rights basis of Finland's foreign policy must be ensured.
- (12) As mentioned in the Government report, the war also affects global development and the achievement of the sustainable development goals as a result of the increase in the price of food and energy, among other factors. It is also important for Finland to increasingly pay attention to the global impacts of the war and continue pursuing a foreign and security policy, including development policy, that is based on a broad security concept.
- (13) In general, it is necessary to address the root causes of conflicts in crisis situations, promote conflict prevention and ensure the provision of humanitarian aid. The Committee considers it to be important for Finland to not only be prepared but also, for its part, promote dialogue, diplomacy, arms control, disarmament, conflict resolution and peacebuilding with sufficient resources.
- (14) In regards to support to the multilateral, rule-based international system, the Foreign Affairs Committee highlights the significance of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe in particular. Due to Russia's veto power, the capability of the UN Security Council to resolve the ongoing war is non-existent, which has highlighted the significance of the rest of the UN system. In this context, it may be noted that Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also led to Russia's expulsion from the Council of Europe. In regards to the OSCE, the Committee considers it to be regrettable that Russia undermines the organisation's operational capabilities with its actions. It is also important for Finland to try and find ways to restore the OSCE's operational capability as part of the preparations for Finland's Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2025.
- (15) The Committee has considered issues related to the broad security concept used in foreign policy more thoroughly in its reports on the Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy and the Government Report on Development Policy (UaVM 1/2019 vp; UaVM 1/2022 vp). The promotion of human rights is also considered in the committee report currently being prepared on the Government Report on Human Rights Policy.

Reinforcing foreign, security and defence policy

Maintaining and developing national defence capability

- (16) The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that Finland's national defence is the basis of Finland's defence under all circumstances and in all security policy decisions. It is based on conscription, a trained reserve, defence of the entire country, and high will to defend the country. The national defence capability is reinforced with diverse international defence cooperation. It is important to ensure sufficient resources for national defence, taking into account the requirements of the security environment at any given time.
- (17) In its statement on the Government report, the Defence Committee considered the reinforcement of Finland's national defence capability and projects aiming for it in more detail. (PuVL 3/2022 vp). Taking the changed security environment into account, the Committee considers it to be important for this ongoing work to be continued systematically and in the long term.

The European Union as a foreign, security, and defence policy actor

- (18) The Committee gives importance to the Government report's point about the European Union being the most important value and security community for Finland. Finland's potential NATO membership will not change the fact that, for Finland, the EU is an important security community and the most important influence channel with regard to foreign policy. In the Government report, it is noted that Finland responds to Russia's actions as part of the European Union. As a result of Russia's actions, the relationship between the EU and Russia has also been deeply damaged and is more difficult to manage than before.
- (19) The EU has strongly denounced Russia's invasion of Ukraine and responded to the situation exceptionally quickly, efficiently and with a united front. The EU has pursued a shared stance with the other key Western partners. Within a short amount of time, the EU has made decisions about providing Ukraine with financial aid, as well as military equipment through the European Peace Facility. The EU has also decided on sanctions of unprecedented severity against Russia. The Committee considers these decisions to be important and also clear indications of the EU's strengthened role as a foreign and security policy actor. However, the requirement of unanimity in the EU's joint decisions has slowed down decision-making related to sanctions concerning the energy sector in particular.
- (20) The Government report notes that the significance of the EU's role as a solidarity and security community is highlighted by the solidarity clause (Article 222 of TFEU) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) in the EU's founding agreements. According to these clauses, every Member State is obligated to provide assistance. The provision and requesting of assistance is based on a national decision, in addition to which each Member State defines for itself what type of assistance it is willing and able to provide. So far, Article 42(7) has only been invoked once – at the request of France in November 2015, after the country was targeted by a terrorist attack. According to a received report, discussions on solidarity and the mutual assistance clause have increased within the EU since the start of the Russian invasion. The Committee considers this to be an important development and emphasises that it is in the interests of Finland's security to pursue concrete content for the aforementioned clauses in order to ensure their credibility and effectiveness in the event of a conflict.
- (21) As part of the reinforcement of European security, Finland participates in the development of the EU's security and defence policy. In recent years, alongside activity focused on crisis management, there has been a considerable emphasis on improving the strategic culture and joint operational capability between the defence administrations of EU Member States. As part of these efforts, the Member States have developed defence industrial cooperation in the EU, sought to reduce strategic dependencies and pursued solutions to issues in security of supply. The most recent step in the development of defence cooperation is the EU's Strategic Compass, approved in March 2022. The Strategic Compass forms a comprehensive

and practical tool for promoting defence cooperation. It includes objectives for developing military capability cooperation and cooperative procurement between Member States, strengthening crisis resilience, enhancing the EU's rapid deployment capacity and crisis management, and improving military mobility, among other things. According to the Government report, there is a strong political will in Europe's current security situation to promote the areas of cooperation agreed upon.

- (22) In regards to the EU's defence dimension, it must be taken into consideration that, despite development, the basic arrangements for Europe's defence have remained largely unchanged: 21 EU Member States have organised their defence through NATO and will continue to rely on it in the future. Unlike NATO, the EU has no shared command or troop structures or military planning for the defence of its Member States. The recently approved Strategic Compass for the EU does not include proposals for introducing a dimension of joint defence in the EU.
- (23) The Committee considers it to be important for Finland to continue its active efforts to develop the EU's defence dimension. In regards to European defence cooperation and the EU's wider strategic autonomy, it is important to consider, in particular, the significant change that took place in Germany's defence policy as a result of the war of aggression launched by Russia. Germany has announced that it will set up a special €100 billion fund to raise its defence budget to 2% of Germany's GDP, among other changes. Finland must monitor the situation and accurately analyse what impacts this change will have on Europe's security arrangements in the long run. Although it is not foreseeable that the EU would develop into a military union within the time frame examined, it must be taken into account that the EU's founding agreements already include the option of joint defence (Article 42(2) of TEU). The paragraph in question states: "The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."
- (24) One important dimension of the EU's common security and defence policy is the development of the cooperation between the EU and NATO. In this situation, in which the majority of the EU Member States are members of NATO, it can be expected that the relationship between the alliance and the union will deepen. The need to develop this cooperation is also expressed in the Strategic Compass. According to the Compass, the cooperation must be beneficial to both parties and mutually complementary in nature. The areas of cooperation taken into account include crisis resilience, hybrid threats, space, maritime security, new technologies and military mobility.

Enhancing cooperation with key partners

- (25) The Government report goes over the options for enhancing defence cooperation with Finland's key partners as part of the response to the weakened security situation. The closest and most important of these partners is Sweden, with which Finland carries out broad-based cooperation. The Committee emphasises the point in the Government report about Finland continuing to deepen its foreign and security policy cooperation and defence cooperation with Sweden without pre-determined restrictions, in accordance with the 2018 Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation. In the changed security situation, the schedule for deepening areas of the bilateral cooperation will be sped up to strengthen both countries' defence and ensure the security of the Baltic Sea region.
- (26) The Government report notes that establishing a defence alliance between Finland and Sweden would require broad parliamentary will in both countries, and such a defence alliance would still not compare to NATO membership and would not be a substitute for it. This view was also highlighted in the hearings of experts by the Committee on the grounds that the considerably more limited capabilities of a Swedish-Finnish alliance compared to a larger alliance would provide a weaker deterrent. Nevertheless, the Committee emphasises that continuing broad-based cooperation with Sweden in all security policy decisions is of the utmost importance for Finland.

- (27) In addition to Sweden, the Government report emphasises the significance of bilateral defence cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen Finland's security. The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that the United States is an important and close partner to Finland and that the long-standing defence cooperation with this country is found to be significant for improving Finland's defence capability. This cooperation is guided by the bilateral statement of intent signed in 2016. In early 2022, further measures were launched between the two countries to deepen their defence cooperation in order to ensure the availability of defence equipment in the event of a crisis, among other things.
- (28) The trilateral defence cooperation launched in 2018 between Finland, Sweden and the United States complements the promotion of the Baltic Sea region's security and the reinforcement of the European security order. The development of the defence policy dialogue, exchange of information and joint operational capability plays a key role.
- (29) The Government report also examines, in the form of a list, Finland's other key bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation arrangements. The reference groups identified as being important to Finland include the Nordic countries through contexts such as Nordic Defence Cooperation (Nordefco); the trilateral defence cooperation arrangements between Finland, Sweden and Norway; intensifying cooperation with the United Kingdom; and multilateral defence cooperation initiatives.
- (30) The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it to be important for the existing forms of cooperation mentioned in the Government report to be strengthened, where possible, as a response to the weakening of the security situation. The Committee has examined these defence cooperation arrangements when considering the 2021 Government Defence Report, for example. At the time, the Committee noted that it considered international defence cooperation to be a cost-effective way to create added value for Finland's defence. These arrangements allow the joint operational capability of the Finnish Defence Forces to be developed together with Finland's key partners. In addition to the technical development of defence cooperation, it is also important to pay attention to the simultaneous development of its political dimension and the exchange of information in order to ensure timely decision-making in conflict situations.
- (31) The importance of deepening international defence cooperation was also emphasised by experts heard by the Committee. The experts assessed that these partnerships are also significant in providing a military deterrent. This deterrent effect is highlighted by the fact that Finland has cooperation arrangements with significant military powers, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States. On the other hand, the experts emphasised that these arrangements do not establish a legal obligation for the partners to ensure each other's security, and they do not incorporate structures for implementing the cooperation, unlike in NATO. The deterrent effect is further weakened by the fact that, with the exception of Sweden, all of Finland's other key defence cooperation partners use NATO as their primary defence solution. The Government report notes that, in a crisis situation, the troops and capabilities of the NATO members are primarily made available to NATO and focused on implementing its joint defence. The Committee does not consider deviations from this principle to be likely.
- (32) The most recent example of enhanced bilateral cooperation is the declaration signed between Finland and the United Kingdom on 11 May 2022 regarding the enhancement of security and defence cooperation between the two countries. In this declaration, the countries reiterate their preparedness to support each other, should either country suffer a disaster or an attack. The Committee gives importance to this declaration, including its timing from the perspective of Finland's NATO membership process.

Enhancing cooperation with NATO

NATO as an organisation

- (33) One of the methods mentioned in the Government report that would increase Finland's security is NATO membership. The Government report closely examines NATO's fundamental tasks and nature as a defence alliance and transatlantic political community. The report notes that the most important task of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is to guarantee the security of its member countries through political and military means. The member countries' commitment to joint defence according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty plays a key role. In order to invoke this article, the situation must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council, i.e. NATO member countries. NATO member countries retain their national autonomy, and NATO's decision-making is based on unanimity. The organisation's military structure is subject to political control by the member countries.
- (34) NATO's ability to implement joint defence is based on an integrated military command structure, a joint defence planning process, operational plans and joint exercises. Through joint defence, NATO seeks to raise the threshold for an attack as high as possible. Taking into account the magnitude of the United States' military power compared to the combined military resources of the alliance's other member countries, NATO's deterrent effect ultimately relies on the United States' military capabilities and nuclear deterrent.

Finland's cooperation with NATO

- (35) The Committee notes that Finland already has a close and deep partnership with NATO. This partnership has become an important part of Finland's security policy. In its consideration of issues related to Finland's cooperation with NATO, the Committee emphasised that it is essential for Finland's security that NATO continue its open door policy, i.e. keeping the option of accession to NATO open to countries that meet NATO's requirements. NATO has confirmed the continuation of this policy for its part. The option to apply for NATO membership has been recorded in the Finnish Government's reports on foreign, security and defence policy since 2004.
- (36) Finland has been involved in NATO's Partnership for Peace programme since 1994 and has belonged to the group of Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP), i.e. closer partners of NATO, since 2014. Through military cooperation carried out under these formats and by concurrently growing closer to NATO at the diplomatic level, Finland has achieved a considerably high joint operational capability with NATO. The strong status of democracy in Finland and the general view of Finland as a country that takes military issues seriously and maintains its national defence capabilities under all circumstances also contribute to the view that Finland has high practical capabilities and meets the qualifications for a full NATO membership. On the other hand, it has been clear that, as a partner country, Finland is not part of the organisation's collective defence. Therefore, the military deterrent effect is considerably lower in a partnership than in a full membership.

NATO membership

- (37) According to the Government report, the most important effect of NATO membership for Finland would be Finland's participation in NATO's joint defence and being covered by the security guarantees under Article 5. The deterrent effect of Finland's defence would be considerably greater than it is now, as it would be backed by the capabilities of the entire alliance. However, in the event that Finland was targeted with military force while being a NATO member, Finland would defend itself with support from the alliance in accordance with joint defence arrangements prepared and practised in advance.
- (38) The Foreign Affairs Committee agrees with this point. The key objective of Finland's foreign and security policy is to ensure the security and well-being of Finland and its population, in addition to safeguarding

the State's autonomy and territorial integrity. In this considerably weakened security situation, anticipated to last for an extended period of time, the Committee considers the reinforcement gained from NATO membership to be significant with regard to this objective. Among the options available for increasing security, NATO membership would provide strong additional protection for Finland's security thanks to its military deterrent effect.

- (39) Finland's NATO membership is a solution that would reinforce Finland's defence and NATO's collective defence. It does not change the principle that Finland's territory will continue to only be used in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international agreements binding on Finland.

NATO profile

- (40) As noted in the Government report, new member countries have full rights and obligations upon accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. According to a received report, the accession protocols of NATO members and the instruments of accession submitted by applicants are brief, technical documents that have clear formal requirements, are based on a standardised format and concern accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. The Committee considers it to be important for Finland to follow the same model, with the aim of seeing the membership application process through as quickly as possible.
- (41) At the same time, the Committee emphasises that it is important, following the submission of Finland's membership application, to initiate discussion and consideration of the type of role that Finland intends to take on as a NATO member in terms of security policy. It is also important to continue using active and proactive diplomacy and pursuing foreign and security policy that promotes stability – including crisis management, conflict prevention and peace mediation – as a NATO member. It is essential to communicate to all of the main countries involved that Finland's purpose in applying for NATO membership is to seek additional defensive protection to ensure the country's security. Finland's potential membership is not targeted at anyone; instead, its purpose is to reinforce Finland's security.
- (42) The Committee considers it to be important for Finland to examine and define its gradually forming NATO profile by taking into account the security situation and threat environment prevailing at any given time. The Government reports drawn up on foreign and security policy once per parliamentary term, including Parliament's responses to them, provide a good tool for outlining current issues related to Finland's NATO profile. The important thing is to find a balance that supports Finland's security as much as possible without undermining regional stability.
- (43) This deliberation also involves the issue of NATO's potential military presence in Finland in the form of military bases and troops, as well as the issue of deploying nuclear weapons. Like all decisions concerning a single NATO member country, these issues fall within national autonomy. As a NATO member, Finland would not be forced to host foreign troops, military bases or nuclear weapons in its territory against its will. Finland's most important contribution as a NATO member country would be its capability to defend its own territory. In this context, the Committee points out that section 4 of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) forbids the import of nuclear explosives as well as their manufacture, possession and detonation in Finland. The Committee also notes that it is extremely unlikely for NATO to even propose or consider deploying nuclear weapons in Finland.
- (44) NATO's strategic concept from 2010 outlines that NATO seeks a world free of nuclear weapons, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance. According to the Defence Committee's statement, this approach will not change in the new concept currently being prepared by NATO. This point does not prevent several NATO members from being actively involved in issues related to nuclear weapons control and disarmament. The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it to be important for Finland to also continue its strong role in nuclear weapons control as a NATO member. These efforts and NATO's nuclear deterrent must not be viewed as a juxtaposition; all NATO member countries have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and committed to reducing the amount of

nuclear weapons in the world accordingly, among other things. Within the alliance, active efforts to promote nuclear weapons control must be continued in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which is responsible for NATO's nuclear policy and doctrine. Finland would become its member upon joining NATO. The Committee thinks that it would be natural for Finland, as a NATO member, to continue maintaining its high profile in disarmament matters, including nuclear disarmament, without questioning NATO's nuclear deterrent.

- (45) Regarding the deployment of Finnish troops to NATO's military assistance missions outside Finland, the Defence Committee's statement notes the following: Based on the principle of reciprocity, Finland would become involved in maintaining the stability and security of the entire alliance territory in accordance with NATO's membership obligations. The Committee notes that the previous parliamentary term saw the enactment of legislation on the provision of and request for international assistance, and a provision was also added to the Act on the Defence Forces (551/2007, section 12 b) at the same time regarding who would participate in assistance missions. Conscripts would not be deployed to assistance missions, and the participation of reservists would always be based on volunteering (PuVL 3/2022 vp).
- (46) In regards to issues related to military presence, the Committee consulted experts about the national restrictions imposed unilaterally by NATO members on their own membership. Such restrictions are political decisions made at the national level and are thus not recorded in the North Atlantic Treaty. Finland has no need to set boundary conditions in its application for NATO membership.
- (47) For example, Norway, as part of its Russian policy and regional stability, declared early on in its membership that it would not allow the alliance to deploy permanent troops, military bases or nuclear weapons to its territory. Norway has also limited military exercises in the country's northern areas. This 'Norway model' was considered to clarify the member country's NATO profile on the one hand, while on the other hand it could potentially limit the benefits gained from the membership, should the security situation change, for example.
- (48) The Committee emphasises the significance of Finland and Sweden's simultaneous NATO membership. The Defence Committee's statement considers the significance of Finland and Sweden's NATO membership for military cooperation and security of supply. The Foreign Affairs Committee also emphasises the significance of a potential simultaneous membership for foreign and security policy, bilateral cooperation and wider Nordic cooperation. With Finland and Sweden becoming NATO members, cooperation involving all Nordic countries within the alliance would offer an opportunity for the Nordic countries to strengthen their influence opportunities and position within the organisation and also promote a foreign and security policy based on shared Nordic values in NATO. Nordic cooperation should be an important part of Finland's NATO profile.
- (49) Finland's accession to NATO would not affect the status of the Åland Islands, which is based on international agreements (Convention on the Non-fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands (Finnish Treaty Series 1/1922) and Treaty Concerning the Åland Islands Between Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Finnish Treaty Series 24/1940)), and it is not a barrier to Finland's accession. The Åland Islands' demilitarisation will be honoured, and Åland will retain its status under international law. Finland is prepared to defend the non-alignment of the Åland Islands by taking the necessary measures according to the contractual provisions mentioned above.

Economic impacts of NATO membership

- (50) In its statement, the Finance Committee considered the economic impacts of Finland's NATO membership, the grounds for determining Finland's financial contribution, and the objective of spending at least two per cent of the gross domestic product on defence spending. The direct annual additional cost arising from NATO membership is estimated to be approximately 1–1.5 per cent of Finland's current defence budget, i.e. approximately €60–100 million. The final costs will not be determined until later on

in potential membership negotiations. The Committee considers it to be important for Parliament to receive additional information on the economic impacts of Finland's NATO membership as soon as possible.

- (51) The Defence Committee's statement (PuVL 3/2022 vp) notes that the economic impacts of NATO membership arise from the following and other factors: As a NATO member, Finland would deploy approximately 80–100 people to NATO's military structures at its own expense, which would cost approximately €15–20 million in wages per year. Finland should also contribute to NATO's shared budget, which is approximately €2.5 billion. NATO's shared funding is used to cover the organisation's civilian and military budgets as well as the Security Investment Programme. Looking at Denmark (1.3 per cent) and Norway's (1.6 per cent) financial contributions, Finland's contribution to NATO's shared budget would amount to approximately €20–25 million. Additionally, Finland should participate in the NATO Response Force, which is based on a rotational system. This would probably require additional personnel to be hired for the Finnish Defence Forces due to NATO's high preparedness requirements. NATO membership will also cause costs through the integration of the management and communications systems.
- (52) According to a report received by the Foreign Affairs Committee, NATO membership will also require additional personnel for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. Currently, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has to take care of the increased number of NATO-related tasks by borrowing resources from other important sectors of foreign policy, which in turn hinders the achievement of their objectives.
- (53) For Finland, the two per cent GDP target agreed upon by NATO members would mean maintaining the defence budget at the current level, as strategic acquisitions (fighter aircraft and fleet acquisitions) have increased and continue to increase the percentage of defence spending of GDP, which will vary from 2.0 to 2.3 per cent (calculated based on NATO criteria) during the next budget planning period. However, defence spending should decrease to the previous level once the strategic acquisitions have been made. Between 2010 and 2021, Finland's defence spending as a percentage of GDP varied from 1.6 to 1.3 per cent. As a NATO member, Finland would still decide on the level and allocation of its defence budget at the national level. Currently, there are several member countries that do not meet the agreed two per cent share of GDP. (VaVL 8/2022 vp.) The Foreign Affairs Committee joins with the Finance Committee in emphasising that potential NATO membership must not weaken the requirements for democracy and transparency in Finland's budget process where defence spending is concerned.

Article 5

- (54) The discussions on Finland's potential NATO membership have brought up the topic of NATO's security guarantees, i.e. Article 5, which provides that NATO members undertake to assist the party being attacked by taking, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as they deem necessary, including the use of armed force.
- (55) The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001 led to the North Atlantic Council making the first ever decision to apply Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. By decision of the North Atlantic Council on 12 September 2001, the attack against one member was regarded as an attack against them all.
- (56) NATO's Article 5 has not been tested in a situation in which a country belonging to NATO is the target of a military attack within the alliance's area of operations. On the one hand, this reinforces the notion that the security guarantees are functional. On the other hand, the loose provision on security guarantees in the North Atlantic Treaty also leaves room for the allies to interpret what possible assistance would entail. Ultimately, every member country makes its own political decision on what type of support it wants to provide when assistance is needed. In the Committee's opinion, the principle is that a strong and credible

alliance with joint defence planning would respond determinedly should one or more of its members be attacked.

Consequences

- (57) In addition to impacts on security, the Committee emphasises the political significance and political consequences of NATO membership for Finland. The decision will further consolidate Finland's participation in Western defence arrangements and strengthen its relationship with key partners.
- (58) Finland's membership would double the length of the alliance's land border with Russia and bring NATO nearer to the Kola Peninsula and Saint Petersburg area, which are areas of strategic importance to Russia. This would indirectly affect the relationship between Finland and Russia. This setting is difficult in a situation in which the trust between Russia and the West has largely collapsed as a result of Russia starting a war and in which Russia's actions have also badly damaged Finland's relationship with Russia, as it depends on cooperation. This change is anticipated to be long term. However, it is also important to find functional and professional ways for Finland to cooperate with its important neighbour in the future. The relationship with Russia will remain a key national issue for Finland under all circumstances. Citizens' direct contacts and the efforts of non-governmental organisations also play a role in maintaining cooperation. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that global security threats, such as issues related to arms control and climate change, require cooperation channels with Russia.

Hybrid influence activities

- (59) The Government report notes that Finland is preparing to be targeted by exceptional, broad-based and diverse means of hybrid influence in the short term and long term. Finland's current discussions on security policy are anticipated to be visible as Russia's attempts to influence Finland. The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that hybrid threats are an established part of Russian politics, used to promote the country's own interests, and that Finland also continues to prepare for hybrid influence against Finland. At the same time, emphasis must be placed on Finland's good capability to identify and respond to various attempts to influence matters.
- (60) The Foreign Affairs Committee notes that information operations play a key role in almost all hybrid threat operations. Information operations are continuous, systematic and comprehensive manipulation of the information environment. As noted in the Government report, Russia seeks to control the formation of opinions inside and outside its borders and create a narrative to justify its actions. The Government report notes that Russia's information operations in Western countries have proven to be weaker than anticipated. However, the experts heard by the Committee point out that Russia succeeded in controlling international publicity during the period right before the war of aggression. In the narrative it created, Russia defended itself from NATO's expansion and contractual violations by the West and sought to secure its own security interests through negotiations with the West. For a period of time, this example of an information operation kept Russia's actual decision to launch a war of aggression against Ukraine hidden from the eyes of many Western countries. In its statement (SiVL 11/2022 vp), the Education and Culture Committee paid attention to how the means used in information operations have become more convincing as a result of advances in artificial intelligence, for example. The Committee joins with the Employment and Equality Committee (TyVL 3/2022 vp) in emphasising that every person living in Finland must have equal rights and opportunities to access reliable information about phenomena and events. By sharing reliable information and ensuring its equal accessibility, we can efficiently prevent disinformation attacks.
- (61) The Foreign Affairs Committee joins with the Transport and Communications Committee (LiVL 18/2022 vp) in noting that reliable communications and mass media play a major role in minimising hybrid influence activities and information operations. It is important for citizens to have access to reliable and current information. The Committee also emphasises the importance of maintaining and developing

citizens' media literacy. As noted by the Education and Culture Committee in its statement (SiVL 11/2022 vp), the population's high educational level provides good conditions for strengthening media literacy. Russia's invasion of Ukraine raises concerns and feelings of insecurity among the population but also a will to defend and promote democratic values at all levels of society, from everyday life to politics and national defence. The Committee considers the role of non-governmental organisations to be important when it comes to fostering discussion about war and how citizens can influence matters. In its statement, the Education and Culture Committee also emphasised the development and significance of security skills and capabilities.

- (62) The experts heard by the Foreign Affairs Committee emphasised the significance of strategic communications in preventing hybrid threats. The Committee agrees with the Administration Committee (HaVL 14/2022 vp) that developing Finland's strategic communications is important, as is going over possible needs for legislative changes in order to respond to hybrid threats. Bringing influence attempts to light and also publicly discussing hybrid operations against countries besides Finland contributes to broad social preparedness.
- (63) The Foreign Affairs Committee considers it to be important for Finland to urgently develop its preparedness to respond to hybrid influence activities that exploit migration. The Committee points out that, in the last year, asylum seekers have been instrumentalised for political purposes at the EU's external borders, which has also led to the development of EU legislation. The Committee also considers the Government report's points about the urgent promotion of national preparedness to be a good thing. The Administration Committee has considered this topic in its statement (HaVL 14/2022 vp).
- (64) The Government report examines the potential impacts of Russia's war of aggression on internal security. However, the Administration Committee noted in its statement that the Government report failed to take the preparedness perspective related to the change in the security environment sufficiently into account with regard to internal security, and it also did not take the key role played by the police in the preparedness for hybrid threats sufficiently into account. The Government report did mention the key role of the Finnish Border Guard in monitoring Finland's territorial integrity and security. As stated in the Government report, Finland monitors the longest section of the EU's external border among the Member States. The Administration Committee emphasised the need to prepare for a long-term deterioration of the situation at Finland's eastern border, and it also emphasised issues related to training and recruiting additional personnel. Another thing highlighted in the changed security environment is seamless and practised cooperation between all security authorities, with clearly defined responsibilities.

Cyber security

- (65) Key targets for cyber threats against society include national security facilities and vital functions of society that safeguard the population's living conditions. The functioning of society is highly dependent on cyber secure electrical systems and other administrative and public services.
- (66) In Finland, most of the critical infrastructure is privately owned, while some of it is owned by multinational corporations. The owners have a key responsibility to ensure the cyber security of the critical infrastructure. In its statement (PuVL 3/2022 vp), the Defence Committee assessed that the Finnish Defence Forces have a relatively high capability to protect their own critical networks that are not connected to the internet. In contrast, a report received by the Committee indicates that there are still deficiencies in the capability of the rest of society and other security authorities in particular to protect their critical systems, and measures to rectify these deficiencies must be taken immediately. The urgency of this task is highlighted by the Government report's description of cyber attacks as part of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Other countries in Europe, including Finland, must also prepare for such attempts to influence matters. Developing the protection of critical infrastructure in particular is an urgent task to be undertaken at the national level.

(67) The Foreign Affairs Committee joins with the statement committees in emphasising that Finland must have a timely, comprehensive and shared picture of the cyber situation, in addition to clear management systems, powers and the capability to make use of all of society's resources. Each ministry is responsible for developing the cyber security of its own administrative branch, but cooperation between authorities must also be developed further. The Committee agrees with the statement committees that it is important to create a strategic management model for cyber security and ensure that it supports the development of cyber security comprehensively. International cooperation and cooperation in the EU context are also essential for Finland's cyber security and defence. For example, the prevention of cybercrime requires a significant amount of international cooperation.

Strengthening crisis resilience

(68) Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the change in the security environment affect the population's psychological crisis resilience. Similarly, the claims and threats made by Russia against Finland increase concerns and a sense of insecurity among the population. However, the Foreign Affairs Committee agrees with the statement committees' assessment that these changes simultaneously increase the population's will to defend their country and promote democratic values at all levels of society. The statement committees brought up important observations about different ways to increase society's crisis resilience.

(69) In its statement (SiVL 11/2022 vp), the Education and Culture Committee considered the issue from the perspective of its own sector, which also plays an important role in strengthening and maintaining the crisis resilience of persons arriving in Finland from Ukraine. For example, early childhood education and care, education, cultural, sports and library services, youth work and hobbies contribute to a secure everyday life and trust in society.

(70) In its statement (TyVL 3/2022 vp), the Employment and Equality Committee emphasised that trust and a sense of security are key resources in Finland's internal security. The statement also notes that it is common for the population to become more united in a crisis and points out that special attention must be paid to preventing discrimination during a crisis. The Foreign Affairs Committee also emphasises this perspective and the fact that the Russians living in Finland must not be blamed for Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

(71) The Government report notes that the will to defend the country is based on sufficient national unity and the population finding Finland and the Finnish way of life to be worth defending. The will to defend the country also lays the foundation for overall national defence and overall security, in addition to strengthening the crisis resilience of Finnish society. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has further strengthened Finns' will to defend their own country, which is evident in such things as increased interest in voluntary national defence training. In its statement, the Defence Committee (PuVL 3/2022 vp) emphasised that a high will to defend the country and conscription lay the foundation for Finland's defence solution. The conscription system provides an extensive reserve that makes it possible to defend the entire country. Of Finland's wartime strength of 280,000 troops, 95 per cent consists of reservists, and sufficient refresher training exercises are necessary to maintain the reserve's competence.

Economic impacts and preparedness

(72) As noted by the Finance Committee in its statement (VaVL 8/2022 vp), Russia's war of aggression dims the economic outlook. Finland's economy grew by 3.5 per cent in 2021 and was well on the way to recovery from the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government report expects economic growth to decrease to 1.5 per cent in 2022 and to 1.7 per cent in 2023. According to the Government report, Russia's invasion of Ukraine will reduce global economic growth by 0.5–1.5 per cent and GDP growth in the euro area by 1–2 per cent in 2022. For Finland, it is also worth noting that Russia's gross domestic product may shrink by 10–20 per cent in 2022. The Finance Committee emphasises that there are significant uncertainties related to economic development, such as the duration

of the war, the scope of the sanctions and conflict, and the increase in inflation and interest rates. The impact of the sanctions on Russia's economy and ability to wage war is key. Market volatility has increased, and the uncertainty about the future has risen to a new level.

- (73) The Finance Committee's statement indicates that Russia's invasion of Ukraine will increase the necessary expenses in Finland's general government finances by more than €7 billion in total between 2022 and 2026. Parliament will consider general government finances more closely later this spring as part of the consideration of the General Government Fiscal Plan.
- (74) In its statement (TaVL 23/2022 vp), the Commerce Committee considered issues related to the economic environment, stressing the sensitivity of economic development to changes in the geopolitical situation and emphasising the two-way connection between security policy and the economy. A stable security environment is a condition for a stable economy, investments and growth. On the other hand, a sustainable economy also facilitates investments required by the security policy and the implementation of a credible defence. The Commerce Committee emphasised the significance of future security solutions for how interesting and secure an environment foreign investors and capable workers consider Finland to be. The Committee came to the conclusion that Finland's NATO membership would support the stability of the economic operating and investment environment, the minimisation of Finland's country risk and the maintenance of Finland's image as an attractive and secure country in the long term.
- (75) In its statement, the Commerce Committee also assessed the changes arising in the energy market and energy security as a result of the changed security environment and stressed that a quick withdrawal from Russian energy is also important from the perspective of the stability and energy security of the operating environment. It is also important to take into account the connection between cyber and energy security. The energy sector is part of the critical infrastructure that must be protected.

Security of supply

- (76) The cornerstones of Finland's security of supply system include a network model based on cooperation between the public and private sectors, each administrative branch taking responsibility for security of supply in their own sector, and the determination of the National Emergency Supply Organisation's tasks and resources according to the needs of society at any given time.
- (77) The Government report notes that, although Finland's security of supply model was specifically created to respond to severe disruptions in society, the changed operating environment also requires the sufficiency of Finland's total preparedness to be assessed, particularly because the focus in security of supply is shifting towards safeguarding crisis resilience. According to the Defence Committee (PuVL 3/2022 vp), this challenges the capacity of the National Emergency Supply Fund, particularly in the long run, and highlights the need to ensure a secure funding base in the preparedness for various threats and risks posed to security of supply. The Commerce Committee also paid attention to this point in its statement.
- (78) The statement committees' statements on special issues related to security of supply highlighted the great significance of maritime transport for Finland, food security and the necessity for sufficient domestic production of defence materiel in order to safeguard military security of supply. In its statement (MmVL 11/2022 vp), the Agriculture and Forestry Committee brought up the important role of Russia and Ukraine in the global grain trade. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has increased the price of grain to record levels and also caused an increase in the prices of other agricultural products globally. The Government report outlines that Finland must maintain a sufficient level of preparedness and, to the extent possible, adequate self-sufficiency with regard to the most essential commodities. With regard to logistics, the Transport and Communications Committee (LiVL 18/2022 vp) brought up the great significance of maritime transport for Finnish society and emphasised that Finland must prepare for crises by identifying alternative modes of transport and routes by land and air. The Foreign Affairs Committee also points out the significance of the cooperation between the Baltic Sea states for securing maritime transport.

(79) In regards to Finland's security policy solutions, it is worth noting that the North Atlantic Treaty obligates NATO members to maintain national preparedness. If a country that is not a member of NATO signs a cooperation agreement related to security of supply with a NATO member country, the application of such an agreement is secondary to the needs of NATO member countries in accordance with Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(80) Parliament will consider issues related to security of supply more broadly once the Government submits a report to it on security of supply later this year.

Preparedness for a refugee crisis as a result of Russia's war of aggression

(81) The Government report's section on economic impacts also considered the refugee crisis caused by Russia's war of aggression both at the EU level and in Finland in particular.

(82) The Government report notes that the impacts of Russia's war of aggression reflect widely on global development, the achievement of the sustainable development goals, and regional crises. The global needs for humanitarian aid will increase further in Ukraine, its neighbouring countries and elsewhere due to the increase in the price of food and energy, among other things. The accelerating increase in prices and hunger pose a risk of increasing displacement.

(83) As noted by the Legal Affairs Committee in its statement (LaVL 14/2022 vp), a residence permit may be granted on the basis of temporary protection to those fleeing the war in Ukraine for a maximum of one year at a time. The Foreign Affairs Committee joins with the Legal Affairs Committee in emphasising the need to ensure the rights and protection of unaccompanied children arriving in Finland. The Committee notes that vulnerable women and girls in particular are at high risk of experiencing sexual and gender-based violence due to the conflict and displacement. When it comes to people fleeing the war in Ukraine, Finland must also actively take action at the EU level to prevent human trafficking. Importance is also given to the assessment by the Employment and Equality Committee (TyVL 3/2022 vp) that the migration and displacement caused by wars and conflicts must be taken into account in many ways in order for the measures taken to meet the actual needs and fulfil the obligations set by international agreements.

Protection of critical infrastructure

(84) The Government report includes a section on the protection of critical infrastructure. This topic is addressed in various sections of this committee report. Critical infrastructure refers to the basic structures, services and associated functions necessary to maintain the vital functions of society. As noted in the Government report, evolving technology and digitalisation facilitate new ways to influence matters.

(85) In its statement (HaVL 14/2022 vp), the Administration Committee paid attention to the fact that critical infrastructure is among the long-term targets of foreign intelligence operations in Finland. Fully legal actions, such as business acquisitions or joint projects, may also provide authoritarian countries with access to Finland's critical infrastructure. The Government report briefly touches on issues related to the requirement for authorisation when it comes to business and property acquisitions by foreigners. The Foreign Affairs Committee agrees with the statement committees about the necessity of critical infrastructure being protected under all circumstances. The needs to develop legislation in order to protect critical infrastructure must be handled in order of priority.

Conclusions

- (86) In conclusion, regarding the Government reports on the change in Finland's security environment, the Foreign Affairs Committee notes the following:
- (87) Russia's foreign policy, which has relied on military strength for a long time, and the country's stated objective of wanting to maintain a security structure based on spheres of influence in Europe gained a new dimension when Russia launched a war of aggression against Ukraine. The invasion is anticipated to have long-term impacts on the security environment in Europe and areas near Finland. Choosing not to respond to the situation would narrow Finland's room to manoeuvre in terms of its foreign, security and defence policy.
- (88) The situation requires measures to strengthen Finland's security.
- (89) For Finland, the European Union is the most important value and security community through its broad security impact. Finland must continue its active role in the development of the EU's defence dimension.
- (90) Finland's current comprehensive bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation arrangements are a cost-effective way to create added value for Finland's defence. These arrangements allow Finland to develop the Finnish Defence Forces' joint operational capability with key partners such as Sweden, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
- (91) Thanks to its significant military deterrent effect, NATO membership would provide significant additional protection to ensure Finland's security.
- (92) Finland must apply for accession to NATO with full membership rights and obligations.
- (93) In the next phase following the submission of Finland's membership application, Finland must initiate discussion and consideration of the type of role that it intends to take on as a NATO member in terms of security policy. Active and proactive diplomacy and a foreign and security policy that promotes stability are not in conflict with NATO membership, and it is important for Finland to continue pursuing them as a NATO member. It is essential to communicate to all of the main countries involved that Finland's purpose in applying for NATO membership is to seek additional defensive protection to ensure the country's security.
- (94) With Finland and Sweden becoming NATO members, cooperation involving all Nordic countries within the alliance would offer a significant opportunity to strengthen the security of Northern Europe and promote a foreign and security policy based on Nordic values in NATO. Nordic cooperation must be an important part of Finland's NATO profile.
- (95) As a result of the war launched by Russia in Ukraine, Finland's relationship with Russia has been badly damaged, as it depends on cooperation. Finland's NATO membership will further change this relationship.
- (96) It is important to find functional and professional ways for Finland to cooperate also in the future with its important neighbour and maintain civil society communication. The relationship with Russia will remain a key national issue for Finland under all circumstances.

THE COMMITTEE'S DECISION PROPOSAL

The decision proposal of the Foreign Affairs Committee:

Parliament shall approve the statement on the Government reports VNS 1/2022 vp and VNS 3/2022 vp.

The statement proposal of the Foreign Affairs Committee

Parliament agrees with the Government's position that Finland shall apply for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Parliament also insists on being kept up to date on the progress of the membership application's processing.

Helsinki, 17 May 2022

The following individuals took part in the conclusive deliberation of the matter in the Committee:

Chairperson Jussi Halla-aho, Finns Party Parliamentary Group
Vice Chairperson Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Parliamentary Group
member Eva Biaudet, Swedish Parliamentary Group
member Inka Hopsu, Green Parliamentary Group
member Saara Hyrkkö, Green Parliamentary Group
member Johannes Koskinen, Social Democratic Parliamentary Group
member Jouni Ovaska, Centre Party Parliamentary Group
member Tom Packalén, Finns Party Parliamentary Group
member Jaana Pelkonen, Parliamentary Group of the National Coalition Party
member Kristiina Salonen, Social Democratic Parliamentary Group
member Jussi Saramo, Left Alliance Parliamentary Group
member Mikko Savola, Centre Party Parliamentary Group
member Ville Tavio, Finns Party Parliamentary Group
member Elina Valtonen, Parliamentary Group of the National Coalition Party
member Anu Vehviläinen, Centre Party Parliamentary Group
member Anne-Mari Virolainen, Parliamentary Group of the National Coalition Party
deputy member Harry Harkimo, Liike Nyt-Movement's Parliamentary Group (partly)
deputy member Toimi Kankaanniemi, Finns Party Parliamentary Group (partly)
deputy member Hilikka Kemppe, Centre Party Parliamentary Group (partly)
deputy member Pauli Kiuru, Parliamentary Group of the National Coalition Party (partly)
deputy member Sakari Puisto, Finns Party Parliamentary Group (partly)
deputy member Arto Satonen, Parliamentary Group of the National Coalition Party (partly)
deputy member Peter Östman, Christian Democratic Parliamentary Group (partly)

The following have acted as Committee Secretaries:

Committee Counsel Tiina Larvala
Committee Counsel Jonna Laurmaa